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Abstract 
Uncertainty  surrounds  the  choice  of  instruments  that  internalise  fossil  fuel 
pollution  at  the  local,  regional  and  global  level.  This  work  outlines  the 
considerable growth in the Western Australian (WA) energy sector and explores 
the  available  options  and  potential  hazards  of  using  specific  instruments  to 
internalise  externalities.  These  core  options  are  discussed  with  respect  to 
liberalising  energy  markets,  providing  private  investment  certainty,  and 
imparting commentary on the developments and consequences of reform in the 
WA context. As a large energy exporter, providing certainty for the WA energy 
sector  investment  and  the  community  is  necessary  to  maintain  the  current 
prosperity. Remarkably, in the decades of market reform progress, the absence 
of one essential element is evident: economic externalities. Policymakers are 
under increasing pressure to understand economic reform, new energy markets 
and  the  multifaceted  repercussions  they  entail.  With  modern  energy  reform 
sitting squarely within the milieu of more efficient governments and climate 
policy,  there  are  clear  economic  advantages  to  internalising  negative  and 
positive  externalities  and  other  market  distortions  during  energy  market 
developments.  Ignoring  market  failures  when  commercialising  government-
owned  energy  utilities  in  de-regulated  and  competitive  markets  invites 
continued ad-hoc government interference that generates investment uncertainty 
in addition to a perplexed electorate. 
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1. Introduction  
As  externalities  are  a  form  of  market  failure,  government  interventions  are 
justified in order to minimise their distortionary market influence and impact on 
the community (Gregory Mankiw et al., 2000; Foxon et al., 2005; Jaffe et al., 
2005). The recent Western Australian (WA) gas crisis caused by the June 3 
explosion at Varanus Island was an example of such an intervention. Lack of 
long-term  energy  supply  security  planning  in  the  WA  energy  development 
decisions  lead  to  this  single  mishap  cutting  State  gas  supplies  by  one-third. 
While technically not defined as an externality, energy supply security issues 
distort energy markets in a similar manner to externalities and should also be 
incorporated into energy market restructuring (Owen, 2004; Garnaut, 2008). 
  
At  this  point  in  time,  a  policymaker  should  not  be  surprised  by  a  lack  of 
consensus  with  currently  available  research  findings  on  externality  estimates 
and  should  be  mindful  that  externality  studies  provide  limited  guidance 
(Sundqvist, 2004). The resolution of external cost estimates available are often 
coarse  and  policymakers  should  tread  carefully  when  navigating  towards 
achieving specific policy outcomes. Nonetheless, the implementation of a sound 
internalisation  strategy  requires  a  scientifically  robust  and  comprehensive 
quantification of external costs (Krewitt, 2002). There are several reasonable 
explanations of discrepancies among the results of externality studies including 
differences in fuel characteristics, variable regulatory frameworks, inconsistent 
research  methods,  different  study  scopes,  and  the  basic  assumptions  of  the 
research  (Sundqvist,  2004).  For  example,  it  is  currently  common  to  omit 
external costs such as climate change or nuclear proliferation. While difficult to 
quantify, these issues have the potential to become large external costs, and 
therefore  should  not  be  neglected  in  energy  policy  risk  assessments  (Eyre, 
1997).  This  work  aims  to  present  available  energy  policy  instruments  that 
attempt to internalise negative externalities and characterise the most useful and 
problematic  components  to  policymakers  in  the  context  of  the  WA  energy 
sector. 
Including  externalities  and  other  distortionary  influences  into  the  design  of 
competitive  energy  markets  is  a  logical  evolution  of  the  responsibility 3
governments have to their constituents. Private investors are understandably not 
lining up to invest in non-excludable and non-rival public goods, such as clean 
air that can be acquired for free (Longo and Markandya, 2005). Governments 
must  therefore  be  responsible  for  introducing  value  to  public  goods  by 
internalising market failures (Künzli et al., 2000; Sundqvist, 2004). The million-
dollar  question  is:  can  policy  strategies  be  developed  and  delivered  that 
adequately protect public goods while enhancing the efficiency of competitive 
markets in a politically elegant manner? (Longo and Markandya, 2005).  
Historically,  regulation  has  formed  the  backbone  of  mechanisms  for 
maintaining the quality of the environment. Regulation involves the imposition 
of standards or bans regarding emission and discharges, products or processes 
through  licensing  and  monitoring  (Owen,  2004).  Regulatory  measures  to 
internalise  externalities  involves  passing  a  law  or  issuing  an  administrative 
order banning certain practices and prescribing others, which frequently become 
politically  divisive  (Longo  and  Markandya,  2005).  Government  responses  to 
issues  such  as  energy  supply  security  concerns  and  local  environmental 
pollution have been influenced by various social and health crises for centuries. 
One example is the banning of coal burning in London in 1352 (Owen, 2004). 
While these extreme interventions in the event of crises are often politically 
abrupt, although necessary in the short-term, these wider impacts of these crises 
are often preventable. 
More flexible energy sector regulatory techniques include mandatory minimum 
standards  on  the  adoption  of  low  emission  technologies,  energy  efficiency 
measures for buildings, and restricted natural resource management practices 
(Owen,  2004).  However,  where  cleaner  and  more  efficient  technologies  are 
available it is difficult to justify that excluding the worst performing and most 
damaging  technologies  will  reduce  economic  efficiency  (Diesendorf,  2007). 
The use of “command and control” regulations are often said to be less efficient 
than  economic  measures,  although  this  simplistic  view  disregards  the 
predictable,  administratively  simple,  and  clear  planning  frameworks  that 
standards and regulation provide (Eyre, 1997). In reality, a precise distinction 
cannot be made between market and regulatory instruments as all market-based 
instruments exist in a regulatory and institutional setting (Diesendorf, 2007). In 4
Australia, all of the most prominent competitive energy markets have major 
regulatory  components,  including  the  Mandatory  Renewable  Energy  Target 
(MRET),  the  National  Electricity  Market  (NEM),  and  the  WA  Wholesale 
Electricity  Market  (WEM)  (International  Energy  Agency,  2001;  Australian 
Greenhouse  Office,  2003;  Stewart,  2004;  Western  Australian  Government 
Gazette, 2004; Independent Market Operator (Western Australia), 2006; Kent 
and Mercer, 2006; Outhred, 2007).  
A major attraction of economic instruments is the potentially minor government 
involvement and the efficiency and flexibility they can provide to private firms. 
However, this potential depends on the appropriateness of the instrument for the 
unique conditions in individual markets (Longo and Markandya, 2005). Market-
based economic instruments have been in use by the 1970s, and are designed to 
address  market  distortions  with  a  mix  of  regulatory,  economic,  fiscal  and 
financial  incentives  (Diesendorf,  2007).  Two  strengths  of  market-based 
economic measures are their economy-wide scope and compatibility with other 
measures (MacGill et al., 2006). Economic instruments allow a reduction in the 
overall costs of pollution mitigation to industry, creating a financial incentive 
for firms to continually decrease pollution and allow state governments to raise 
funds that can be used to finance cleaning up pollution or to replace existing 
taxes  and  subsidies  (Longo  and  Markandya,  2005).  However,  even  amongst 
neoclassical economists, no unanimity  exists on how to remedy the external 
effects of market transactions (Antheaume, 2004).  
When policymakers choose the instruments to internalise the externalities in the 
energy sector, they must strive to find a solution that gives the best outcome in 
terms of: efficiency; cost minimisation; impact on the job market; security of 
energy supply; equity of the instrument; time-based closed-ended commitments; 
administrative ease; intellectual property innovation; certainty of the level of 
internalisation,  and;  equity  of  the  instrument.  Governments  must  also 
continually  review  the  outcome  of  such  solutions  (Longo  and  Markandya, 
2005).  It  is  also  important  to  acknowledge  the  limitations  of  externality 
methodologies  to  identify  an  optimal  level  of  policy  intervention  (Krewitt, 
2002).  While  there  are  many  assumptions  and  limitations  involved  in  full 5
external  cost  accounting  methods  and  instruments,  making  use  of  them  is 
preferable to ignoring such costs (Antheaume, 2004).   
Using precautionary principals and a knowledge of the strength and weaknesses 
of  externality  estimation  methodologies  allow  policymakers  to  balance 
investment  outcomes  and  navigate  the  spectrum  of  available  polices  that 
internalise energy pollution and other external costs. These decisions involve 
high political risk in WA, as the economy is highly dependent on energy and 
energy intensive exports. The WA energy sector provides a useful microcosm 
for  studying  the  possible  options  and  consequences  of  competitive  energy 
market  development  with  significant  political,  economic,  social  and 
environmental stakes for the Australian nation and the wider Pacific region. 
2. WA: major energy user and exporter policymaking 
With  a  population  of  slightly  over  2  million,  the  state  of  Western  Australia 
produces  and  uses  a  disproportionately  large  amount  of  energy.  Politically, 
energy reform in a small state with large energy industries can be a hazardous 
exercise, depending on the reform agenda. To appreciate the magnitude of the 
highly charged reforms undertaken in WA, the author has provided a snapshot 
of the energy industry trends in terms of production and value. WA exports over 
50% of the total primary energy produced (See Fig. 1). Unsurprisingly, the WA 
economy relies heavily on export income, with merchandise exports accounting 
for  39%  of  Gross  State  Product  between  2001-02  and  2005-06.  (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2007). 
The export dependent nature of the sector is illustrated by the obvious dip in 
primary energy production in 2003-04 in Fig. 1. This contraction was due to the 
increase in the value of the Australian dollar, which lead to less demand and 
weaker export earnings (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007). Between 2001-
02 and 2005-06 the total primary energy production in WA has increased from 
1740 to 1850 PJ. Over the same period primary energy use has increased from 
727.4 to 808.3 PJ (Parliament of Western Australia, 2007). Between 2001-02 
and 2005-06, crude petroleum oil and natural gas represented 12.7% and 8.1% 6
of the total value of WA’s export commodities. The value of exports from the 
oil and gas extraction industry has increased from $7,389 million to $10,072 
million over the period. Due to the relatively poor quality of WA coal reserves, 
the WA coal industry exported only $300,000 of coal in 2005-06 and produced 
a total of only 6 Mt. This is in contrast to the petroleum refining exports of 
$567.4 million for the same year (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007). The 
total  annual  value  of  WA’s  petroleum  product  production  (petroleum 
condensate, crude oil, liquid natural gas (LNG), and natural gas) increased from 
$9,492  million  in  2001-02  to  $14,555  million  in  2005-06.  Over  that  period, 
WA’s total production of crude oil and LNG was valued at $24,000 million and 
$18,000 million respectively (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007).  
These large production values also correspond to sizable royalty receipts for 
WA. The WA State Government royalty receipts from petroleum and gas for 
each financial year between 2001-02 to 2005-06 was $428.3 million, $488.6 
million, $416.3 million, $549.7 million, 678.8 million, respectively (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2007). In addition, the 2007 WA State budget estimated 
actuals  for  the  Commonwealth  Petroleum  Resource  Rent  Tax  revenues  for 
2006-07 was $668 million, with a 2007-08 budget estimate of $699 million 
(The  Government  of  Western  Australia,  2007).  With  the  current  gas  crisis 
reducing  the  gas  output  by  one  third,  the  loss  of  income  and  the  follow-on 
economic impact is likely to be considerable. The WA Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry received 83 responses from their member businesses in the month 
after the crisis and found that 14% already have or will be shutting down if the 
crisis lasts three months (Pearson, 2008b; Rodgers, 2008). As full gas supplies 
are  expected  to  be  restored  from  Varanus  Island  after  November,  the  WA 
Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  has  stated  that  “every  molecule  of  gas 
saved by not being burned to generate electricity, heat homes, heat water or to 
cook  is  a  molecule  of  gas  that  could  be  made  available  to  businesses  and 
industry that are struggling to keep their doors open and their workers in a job” 
(Pearson, 2008a).  
As several mining companies and exporters have also been forced to scale-back 
production,  this  is  a  significant  blow  to  the  WA  economy.  The  crisis 
underscores the importance of including externalities and market distortionary 7
factors  into  market  reform  and  strategic  planning  as  a  form  of  adaptive 
insurance (Kane and Shogren, 2000). With the costs to businesses in the order 
of hundreds of millions of dollars every  week, the introduction of  a  market 
value to measures that increase energy security and diversify energy supplies 
appear politically sensible (Lovelle, 2008). The growing number of employees 
and  economic  dependence  on  energy  and  energy  intensive  industries  adds 
additional political elements to undertaking market reforms. The total number of 
WA  employees  involved  in  coal,  oil  and  gas  extraction,  electricity  and  gas 
supply  and  petroleum  refining  industries  have  increased  over  75%  in  recent 
years (See Fig. 2). 
This employment increase continued over an annual average decrease in WA 
crude oil production of 6.4% between 2001-02 and 2005-06 due to declining 
field  yields  and  cyclone  damage.  A  combination  of  these  declines  and  the 
increase  domestic  demand  for  transport  fuel  has  resulted  in  a  volumetric 
reduction of crude oil exports of 35.5% over the same period. This is in contrast 
to LNG production increasing 57.6% from 7.4 Mt in 2001-02 to 11.7 Mt in 
2005-06. In addition to the energy production sector employees, the number of 
energy intensive resource jobs has increased 60% from 43,400 to 69,700 over 
the four years between 2001-02 and 2005-06 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2007). These large employment, production and export figures presents major 
challenges to any restructuring of the energy and resources sector, especially to 
a region with such a relatively small populace (Peterson and Rose, 2006). 
2.1 Energy sector reform to date 
Despite the enormity and political acuteness of the task, the Commonwealth and 
WA  State  Government  have  undertaken  a  range  of  alterations  to  energy 
markets. The reform of the domestic natural gas industry can be traced to the 
Natural Gas Strategy adopted by the Commonwealth Government in 1991. The 
strategy promoted: non-discriminatory open access to pipelines; a light-handed 
approach to regulation; intensified interstate trade through removal of regulatory 
barriers,  and;  infrastructure  interconnection  (International  Energy  Agency, 
2001).  Another  significant  change  was  a  federally  appointed  inquiry  into 
electricity competition known as the Hilmer Report, which subsequently formed 8
the  basis  for  the  National  Competition  Policy  (NPC).  The  Hilmer  Report 
considered  competition  in  terms  of  six  elements:  limiting  anti-competitive 
conduct by firms; reformation of competition restricting legislation; reforming 
structural  change  to  monopolies;  provision  of  third  party  access  to  public 
facilities; restriction of monopoly pricing behaviour, and; fostering competitive 
neutrality between private and government adversaries (Beresford, 2000). As 
they  stand,  the  dominant  objective  of  Australian  electricity  markets  is  to 
minimise energy prices to consumers. While this is a sensible objective, it does 
not adequately incorporate the increasing demand for energy, external costs or 
energy  efficiency  on  an  equal  basis  with  supply  cost  concerns  (Diesendorf, 
2007).  
The absence of price mechanisms that recognise major externalities associated 
with energy use in competitive markets is distortionary. The classic example is 
when clean energy technologies such as wind turbines, compete in electricity 
markets  with  fossil  fuel  technologies  when  no  value  is  placed  on  pollution. 
Naturally,  private  investors  are  looking  to  maximise  their  private  economic 
return. If a market enables participants to impose costs to others unconnected 
with the investment, the option that exports the most cost is more likely to be 
profitable. While markets are structured to enable participants to impose costs 
on  others,  the  cost  differential  between  clean  and  fossil-fuel  technologies  is 
likely to be closed slowly (Fairfield, 2006). 
Western Australia is the only state that is not part of the National Electricity 
Market  due  to  practical  reasons  of  geography  (MacGill  et  al.,  2006).  To 
facilitate  an  efficient  electricity  sector,  the  WA  State  Government  opted  to 
develop a stand-alone electricity market tailored to the unique growth occurring 
in the state.  In recent  years, peak  electricity demand growth has outstripped 
generation investment and WA has seen electricity blackouts during summer 
peak demand. From 2001-02 to 2005-06 the electricity sector final energy use 
has seen a growth of 19% from 82.2 PJ to 97.7 PJ (See Fig. 3) (Parliament of 
Western Australia, 2007). 
It  was  deemed  politically  necessary  to  reform  the  states  electricity  sector  to 
ensure a secure electricity investment programme. The WA government owned 9
and  operated  utility  reform  included  vertical  disaggregation  into  separate 
generation,  retail,  and  transmission/distribution  components,  together  with 
corporatisation  or  privatisation  (International  Energy  Agency,  2001).  The 
disaggregation of the single vertically integrated government owned utility into 
four components allowed the establishment of the WA Wholesale Electricity 
Market (WEM). The aim of the WEM is to provide a more efficient mechanism 
for  energy  industry  participants  to  trade  electricity  within  the  South-West 
Interconnected  System  (SWIS)  (Independent  Market  Operator  (Western 
Australia),  2007).  The  WEM  provides  an  opportunity  to  encourage  a  more 
reliable  and  competitive  energy  industry  using  demand  side  management 
options and private renewable energy investment (Western Australian Office of 
Energy, 2006).  
The  WEM  developers  recognised  that  ensuring  sufficient  generating  plant 
investment was required in a small electricity network such as the SWIS.  To 
meet  the  forecasted  future  electricity  demand  on  the  SWIS,  the  Reserve 
Capacity  Mechanism  was  developed.  This  mechanism  ensures  adequate 
capacity to meet SWIS peak demand by paying owners of certified generating 
plants and demand side management providers to be available to either generate 
or reduce demand. The Independent Market Operator (IMO) purchases credits 
through an auction process as energy demand increases (Independent Market 
Operator (Western Australia), 2008a). Although the development of the WEM 
saw the incorporation of generation capital supply security with the Reserve 
Capacity  Mechanism,  it  arguably  disregards  fuel  supply  security  and  the 
investment requirements for electricity distribution. 
One role of the IMO is to collect and disseminate technical and market data and 
investment opportunities in the WEM. This revealing information has become a 
valuable resource to investors and policymakers. The IMO has stated for some 
time  that  the  insufficient  capacity  from  the  small  Dampier  to  Bunbury  gas 
pipeline  has  inhibited  further  gas-fired  generation  investment  on  the  SWIS. 
Recently the pipelines Stage 5B pipeline expansion and further extensions have 
largely  overcome  this  issue,  however,  restrictions  in  new  gas  supplies  and 
recently higher gas prices continue to limit gas-fired investment (Independent 
Market Operator (Western Australia), 2008a). With the onset of the gas crisis 10
these fuel supply security issues have been exacerbated, although not in the way 
many would have expected. As around one sixth of the generation capacity in 
the  SWIS  is  able  to  run  on  liquid  and  gas  fuels,  the  daily  percentage 
contribution of the liquid fuels to SWIS demand increased from between one 
and six percent to between approximately ten and thirty percent. The increase 
use of distillate and diesel is likely to result in liquid fuel imports. Interestingly, 
the  gas  crisis  and  the  subsequent  government  calls  to  reduce  energy 
consumption appears to have had no effect on the operational demand on the 
SWIS (Independent Market Operator (Western Australia), 2008b). 
Outcomes of competitive markets depend strongly on the direct costs faced by 
competitors. Consequently energy markets are unlikely to deliver a reduction in 
pollution  or  improve  energy  security  without  special  consideration  of 
internalising  market  distortions  and  giving  them  a  market  value.  Distorted 
prices  lead  to  sub-optimal  investments  and  operating  decisions  that  incur 
unnecessary  long-term  costs  unless  such  externalities  are  taken  into  account 
(Outhred et al., 2002). The continued growth of operational demand over the 
gas crisis is a clear example of when operational decisions in both the public 
and private interest are ignored when they have no market value. Another good 
example  of  electricity  sector  markets  providing  no  incentive  to  invest  in 
essential  elements  of  supply  security  is  the  under-investment  in  network 
infrastructure.  
  
The disaggregated network utility natural monopoly (Western Power) reported 
that  a  great  deal  of  investment  in  network  upgrades  were  required  before 
substantial  generation  can  be  accommodated  in  the  SWIS.  Western  Power 
publishes an Annual Planning Report (APR), which includes the status of the 
SWIS transmission and distribution system. The transmission system is nearing 
capacity  in  several  locations,  predominantly  due  to  new  generation  capacity 
requirements  and  energy  flow  requirements  across  the  network.  While  the 
WEM reduces electricity prices by increasing competition between electricity 
retailers and generators, the WEM as it stands is unable to provide certainty of 
where new generation will be built with sufficient time for the network utility to 
build the electricity infrastructure required to connect it to. The geographical 
generation uncertainty and the temporal disparity between the WEM Capacity 11
Mechanism and Western Power’s planning and construction timetable has lead 
to  the  decision  of  undertaking  extensive  upgrades  through  the  transmission 
system. Unfortunately, the length of time required to complete these upgrades 
have  not  fully  solved  problems  concerning  new  generation  capacity  being 
unable  to  receive  certification  under  the  Capacity  Mechanism  rules  and  the 
subsequent  delay  or  postponement  of  its  construction  (Independent  Market 
Operator  (Western  Australia),  2008a).  In  addition  the  cost  of  the  extensive 
network upgrades are being absorbed by the taxpayer, a minority of which have 
been  refused  connection  due  to  insufficient  generation  and  transmission 
capacity in the southwest of the SWIS. As many of these concerns are external 
to the function and mandate of the WEM, it is clear that generation investments 
under  current  structures  allow  costs  of  network  upgrades  to  be  passed  onto 
taxpayers with little regard for the economic efficiency of the total investment 
required. 
3. Market restructuring policy options 
Energy market restructuring is a complex, difficult and recurring processes that 
has engineering, economic, social, commercial, legal and policy dimensions and 
takes place within a broad societal context (Outhred, 2007). Factors to be taken 
into  account  when  planning  energy  systems  include  economic  cost, 
development, energy security, environmental concerns and equity. Governments 
play  an  important  role  in  forging  policies,  bodies  and  measures  that  reduce 
conflict between these areas (MacGill et al., 2006; Peterson and Rose, 2006). 
Independent  market  operators  and  regulators  assist  governments  can  make 
significant progress when provided with a mandate and sufficient capacity to act 
on the behalf of the public interest. A range of internalisation tools are available 
to such bodies, but none provide a complete solution (Eyre, 1997). Therefore, a 
mix  of  policy  instrument  options  is  often  required  to  obtain  best  acceptable 
outcomes for all stakeholders (Longo and Markandya, 2005). 
3.1 Policy option A: Taxes 
Energy taxes are a relatively straightforward solution, although in practice there 
are  complications  when  quantifying  damages  and  differentiating  costs  on 12
various technologies and fuels. For example, the impact of a simple carbon tax 
would not recover the external costs of nuclear fuels and technologies, which 
would be an unmerited advantage for the nuclear industry (Owen, 2004). The 
tax revenue would also have to be distributed in a manner that worked actively 
with the tax, as to not reimburse the industries that caused the external costs in 
the first place. Taxes are theoretically a preferred option where there are many 
polluters and where damages are independent of the point source, such as when 
coal-fired  generation  particulate  emissions  exacerbate  upper  respiratory  tract 
infections (Eyre, 1997; Kjellstrom et al., 2002).  
The worst of any tax imposed on the poorer sections of society would also have 
to  be  offset  to  ensure  the  tax  burden  did  not  disproportionately  affect  them 
(Owen, 2004). It is important for policymakers to keep in mind that increasing 
the  unit  prices  of  energy  does  not  lead  to  an  increase  in  energy  bills  when 
energy is used more efficiently. In the long run, the increased cost of goods and 
services from the introduction of Pigovian style taxes will tend to increase the 
relative generation of positive externalities in an economy. For example, a coal 
price that takes into account negative externalities will stimulate technological 
advancement  in  energy  resources  and  efficiency,  which  reduces  coal 
consumption and its associated negative externalities (Diesendorf, 2007). 
Carbon taxes at the international level have been discussed extensively, but it 
has never been politically acceptable to a wide range of countries. Carbon taxes 
in various forms have been implemented in Denmark, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Owen, 
2004).  Sweden  is  one  of  few  countries  that  managed  to  include  coal  in  its 
carbon tax, but many countries continue to subsidise coal production (Longo 
and Markandya, 2005). A carbon tax in Australia is extremely unlikely in the 
current  economic  conditions and the energy intensiveness of much domestic 
production and consumption.    
3.2 Policy option B: Subsidies 
Where taxing polluters is deemed to be politically unacceptable, targeting grants 
and subsidies towards clean energy technologies is one option (Owen, 2004).  In 13
recent  times,  subsidies  have  been  the  preferred  instrument  for  Australian 
domestic  energy  policy.  Policymakers  should  be  aware  that  governments 
choosing technology “winners” is always controversial. Governments are not 
often  the  appropriate  arbiters  of  determining  the  technology  that  is  to  be 
supported, as past experience shows that political momentum forming behind 
ill-advised,  technology  specific  initiatives  that  stifle  superior  technological 
options, can become politically difficult to stop (Jaffe et al., 2005). One future 
example  of  this  form  of  “lock-in”  may  be  the  current  corn-based  ethanol 
subsidies in the USA. 
Subsidising  cleaner  alternatives  can  reduce  external  costs,  but  will  not 
internalise  them  (Eyre,  1997).  Nonetheless,  subsidies  given  to  clean  energy 
industries should, in theory, have an overall positive impact on the job market 
by creating more jobs than conventional technologies (Longo and Markandya, 
2005;  Diesendorf,  2007).  Many  clean  technologies  require  increases  in  the 
skilled  domestic  labour  force  per  unit  of  energy  output.  This  is  the  case  in 
Australia as clean technologies often contain more domestic content than the 
majority  of  imported  conventional  energy  system  components  (Diesendorf, 
2007).  
The most significant renewable energy technology subsidy is the Renewable 
Remote Power Generation Programme (RRPGP). The RRPGP was introduced 
in  July  2000  and  was  originally  an  initial  $264  million  to  support  the 
replacement  of  diesel  in  diesel-fuelled  SPS  systems  with  renewable  system 
components (Parliament of Australia: Senate, 2000). Funds were allocated to 
the States and the Northern Territory on the basis of the certified diesel fuel 
excise paid in each jurisdiction by public generators (Australian Greenhouse 
Office,  2003).  The  RRPGP  provided  up  to  50%  of  the  capital  value  of  the 
replacement  or  new  renewable  generation  capacity  for  off-grid  users  of 
traditionally fossil fuel powered systems. From 2005, eligibility was extended to 
fringe-of-grid  installations,  displacements  of  other  fossil-fuels  (principally 
natural gas), energy efficiency measures and solar hot water heaters (Outhred et 
al., 2002). From 2001-02 to 2006-07 the total capital cost subsidies paid out 
under the RRPGP in WA was slightly over AUD$41 million. The introduction 
of this rebate saw a massive increase in renewable energy components in WA 14
and  has  underpinned  the  development  of  WA’s  renewable  energy  industry 
(Parliament of Western Australia, 2007). Throughout 2008, the RRPGP funding 
has been revised. 
In addition to rebates, another method used to increase uptake of zero pollution 
technologies are feed-in tariffs. A feed-in tariff (FiT) involves an obligation on 
the  part  of  energy  suppliers  to  purchase  electricity  produced  by  particular 
technologies and/or accredited producers at a specified price guaranteed for a 
period of time, generally 15-20 years (Longo and Markandya, 2005; Diesendorf, 
2007).  FiTs  and  competitive  bidding  processes  result  in  an  external  cost 
minimisation, but as they do include subsidies, they can entail significant fiscal 
and administration costs. Nonetheless, international experience with FiTs have 
shown that this instrument has effectively diffused new technologies into energy 
supply systems (Longo and Markandya, 2005). In Australia, several states and 
territories have investigated FiTs, although at this time only Queensland and 
South  Australia  have  existing  schemes  (International  Energy  Agency,  2008) 
Queensland’s Solar Bonus Scheme pays small electricity customers (defined as 
customers that consume less than 100MWh yr
-1) $AUD0.44 kWh
-1 (net) from 
photovoltaic systems less than 10kVA for single phase and 30kVA for 3 phase 
systems until 2028 (Queensland Department of Mines and Energy, 2008). South 
Australia has an identical scheme although the small electricity customer must 
consume less than 160MWh yr
-1 (Government of South Australia, 2008). The 
Victorian  Government  will  introduce  a  premium  FiT  in  2009  that  will  pay 
AUD$0.60  kWh
-1  (net)  for  PV  systems  that  are  no  larger  than  2kW 
(Government of Victoria, 2008). The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has 
passed FiT legislation, which is expected to be implemented by the end of 2008. 
The ACT scheme pays 3.88 times the domestic electricity price for photovoltaic 
systems that are equal to or less than 10kVA, 3.104 times for systems greater 
than 10kVA up to 30kVA, and 2.91 times for systems larger than 30kVA (The 
Legislative Assembly for the Australian Capital Territory, 2008). WA has no 
FiT to date, although the newly elected government has indicated in-principal 
support for a WA FiT scheme.   
One significant advantage of FiTs is the certainty it gives to investors (Longo 
and  Markandya,  2005).  If  investors  can  determine  the  output  of  an  energy 15
system  and  receive  a  government  guaranteed  price  for  each  unit  of  energy 
exported to energy markets, they simply find it easier to obtain capital funds and 
the investment becomes low risk. FiTs would also complement the Australian 
policymaker preference to subsidise the capital costs of clean energy system 
components (Diesendorf, 2007). 
3.3 Policy Option C: Certificates 
Green energy certificates (or credits) are entities that give electricity retailers 
more  flexibility  when  regulation  imposes  a  minimum  requirement  of  a 
percentage  of  total  electricity  sold  to  be  sourced  from  renewable  energy 
capacity. These cross-subsidies are commonly funded by either all electricity 
consumers, the taxpayer, or by individuals voluntarily paying higher unit prices 
for  “green  electricity”  (Longo  and  Markandya,  2005;  Diesendorf,  2007). 
Producers of accredited green electricity are allocated green certificates to sell, 
which  improves  the  economics  of  clean  generation  investments.  These 
certificates  allow  clean  generators  to  compete  in  markets  with  polluting 
technologies  that  externalise  their  pollution  costs.  Such  schemes  effectively 
reward  clean  energy  producers  for  not  producing  external  costs  (Longo  and 
Markandya, 2005). In Australia, the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 
sets the framework for a Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) and 
gave  rise  to  the  Renewable  Energy  Certificate  (REC).  The  Office  of  the 
Renewable Energy Regulator (ORER), a statutory agency, administers the Act, 
the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Charge 2000 and the Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Regulations 2001. One REC is  created by  accredited renewable 
energy  generators  and  registered  by  the  Office  of  the  Renewable  Energy 
Regulator  (ORER)  for  each  MWh  of  clean  electricity  exported  to  networks 
(Office  of  the  Renewable  Energy  Regulator,  2006).  RECs  are  used  to 
demonstrate compliance with the objectives of the MRET to increase renewable 
electricity generation, as electricity retailers must purchase increasing amounts 
of  RECs  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  electricity  they  sell  (Office  of  the 
Renewable Energy Regulator, 2006). 
  
GreenPower is another mechanism that operates in Australia and is available in 
Western Australia. GreenPower works alongside the MRET and allows greater 16
flexibility  in  transferring  RECs  to  clean  energy  markets,  such  as  carbon 
offsetting  companies.  These  certificates  do  not  internalise  the  social  and 
environmental  costs  of  energy  production,  but  do  subsidise  socially  and 
environmentally benign technologies (Owen, 2004). The main tasks required of 
governments in the trading of green certificates is to fix the quota and provide 
long-term  goals  for  clean  energy  use  and  provide  the  often  considerable 
investment required to verifying certificates and accrediting generators (Longo 
and Markandya, 2005). These schemes are attractive to governments as they can 
be justified as reducing the levels of external costs imposed on the community, 
while being more palatable than a tax (Owen, 2004). Green electricity schemes 
are attracting an increasing number of subscribers in Australia. Although their 
fatal flaw is most consumers are unwilling to pay higher prices to secure public 
goods from which everyone can benefit (Longo and Markandya, 2005). 
3.4 Option D: Emission trading 
Emissions  trading  has  recently  been  proposed  as  the  “central  instrument  of 
Australian  mitigation”  in  the  draft  Garnaut  report,  released  in  June  2008 
(Garnaut,  2008).  Emission  trading  schemes  involves  setting  a  target  of 
permitted  emissions,  allocation  permits  to  pollution  producers,  choosing  an 
amount of permits appropriate to a target, and mandating producers to acquire 
enough permits to cover their emissions (Diesendorf, 2007). Legislation usually 
forms  the  basis  for  emitter  compliance  and  is  generally  mandatory  with 
penalties  for  non-compliance  (Owen,  2004).  An  emission  permit  is  a 
transferable  permit  for  emitting  a  specific  quantity  of  pollution  into  the 
atmosphere for a specified duration. Producers either purchase or are allocated 
such permits and thereafter are able to trade these with other firms or surrender 
them for pollution produced. Firms investing in pollution reduction processes 
and technologies are able to trade more permits and recover some of the costs of 
the investment in efficiency (Nenkova, 2005). There are a variety of forms of 
emission trading schemes, including “cap and trade”, “baseline and credit” as 
well as variations where permits can be allocated to individuals and/or large 
emitters. The nuances of these variants are arguably less politically important 
than the method that pollution permits are allocated in a trading scheme. 17
In  a  tradable  emission  permit  approach,  the  allocation  of  permits  among 
industries  is  often  the  subject  of  controversy,  as  the  two  methods, 
grandfathering  and  auctioning,  have  very  different  abatement  costs  to  the 
polluter. Grandfathering on the basis of the historical output means the polluter 
receives permits equivalent to their emissions for free and must only pay the 
abatements cost. On the other hand the alternative of auctioning permits forces 
polluters  to  pay  the  cost  of  abatement  at  a  new  emission  level  (Longo  and 
Markandya, 2005). From a policymakers perspective, grandfathering provides 
greater political control over the effects to particular industries, while auctions 
reduce  politically  contentious  arguments  surrounding  lobby  groups,  allows 
greater  flexibility  in  cost  distribution  and  gives  greater  incentives  for  new 
market  entrants  and  technological  innovation  (Longo  and  Markandya,  2005; 
Diesendorf, 2007; Garnaut, 2008). Auctioning emission permits also minimise 
costs  to  governments  (Longo  and  Markandya,  2005;  Commonwealth 
Government  of  Australia,  2008;  Garnaut,  2008).  A  combination  of 
grandfathering  and  auctioning  is  one  means  of  conciliation,  with  one  or  the 
other being phased out over time. 
Emission trading is regarded as efficient because it combines the advantage of 
flexibility and efficiency free markets while having a level of certainty of the 
reduction  or  final  emission  level  (MacGill  et  al.,  2006;  Commonwealth 
Government of Australia, 2008; Garnaut, 2008). In reality, it may be difficult 
for policymakers to predict how wide-ranging market-based instruments may 
interact  with  other  existing  policy  measures  (MacGill  et  al.,  2006;  Garnaut, 
2008). In light of the mixed phase I progress in the European Union Emission 
Trading  Scheme,  it  is  likely  to  be  difficult  to  determine  if  an  Australian 
domestic scheme will effectively reduce emissions beyond business as usual. 
3.5 Option E: Informative measures & voluntary agreements 
Governments  can  influence  the  actions  of  households  and  firms  by  utilising 
advertising campaigns, environmental labelling, demonstration projects and by 
facilitating  environmental  initiatives  (Owen,  2004).  Other  less  common 
approaches in Australia that are available to WA policymakers are generation 
disclosure legislation. Generation disclosure refers to the requirement of utilities 18
to provide their customers with additional information about the energy they are 
supplying. This can include a number of useful indicators, such as fuel mix 
percentages and emission statistics (Longo and Markandya, 2005).  
A  new  class  of  semi-informative  measure,  voluntary  agreements  are  often 
referred to as an economic instrument. These instruments include commitments 
made by individual companies as a result of negotiations with public authorities. 
They  have  a  potency  to  influence  behaviour  that  lies  between  informative 
measures  and  economic  instruments.  It  is  often  argued  that  voluntary 
approaches  are  unproductive  for  policymakers  as  they  often  do  not  produce 
significant  results,  with  firms  choosing  easy  to  reach  targets  that  reflect 
“business as usual” trends of increasing efficiency for financial reasons (Longo 
and  Markandya,  2005;  Diesendorf,  2007;  Commonwealth  Government  of 
Australia, 2008).  
  
Assessment  of  the  success  of  Australian  voluntary  agreements,  such  as  the 
Greenhouse Challenge and Greenhouse Challenge Plus programmes have been 
difficult due to the untidy distinction between emission reduction attributable to 
the  programme  or  those  which  may  have  resulted  from  normal  business 
efficiency measures (Diesendorf, 2007). Another issue surrounding voluntary 
agreements comes with the dissipation of the initial pressure once an agreement 
is  signed.  The  firms  then  have  the  opportunity  to  not  comply  with  their 
commitments  because  most  agreements  do  not  include  monitoring  or 
sanctioning mechanisms. Voluntary agreements can be an expensive option for 
both the government and the companies involved, as time and negotiation costs 
can  be  large  when  parties  have  difficulty  in  reaching  agreement.  Voluntary 
agreements  are  best  suited  to  industries  with  a  management  history  of 
understanding  their  specific  environmental  problems  alongside  substantial 
incentives for compliance and demanding targets (Longo and Markandya, 2005; 
Diesendorf, 2007).  19
4. Words of caution for the policymaker 
There is no single policy instrument to internalise all externalities or market 
distortions and a range of policy instruments are often needed in regions such as 
Western Australia (Eyre, 1997). Whatever array of instruments are chosen by 
policymakers, it must be made clear that market-compatible approaches should 
be  used  to  incorporate  economic  social  and  environmental  externalities  and 
market  distortions  (Outhred  et  al.,  2002).  A  policymaker  must  carefully 
consider  the  consequences  that  instruments  will  have  on  the  economy  and 
carefully consider who will finally pay for the externality (Garnaut, 2008). The 
most efficient mechanism is not always the most economically equitable. An 
increase in production costs are likely to be passed on to consumers, who will 
bear the burden of the externality (Longo and Markandya, 2005). Market-based 
approaches  provide  incentives  for  parties  with  vested  interests  to  influence 
market  designs  that  provide  a  competitive  advantage  to  them.  Policymakers 
should not be surprised when firms explore weaknesses to exploit when seeking 
to minimise the costs of meeting their obligations: the greater the complexity of 
policies, the greater the likelihood that a weakness exists (MacGill et al., 2006).  
Proponents of the established energy system often attempt to block the diffusion 
of competitive technologies by influencing the institutional framework so they 
retain the competitive advantage (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2003). This may make 
business sense to individual firms, but will be to the detriment of the market and 
will likely introduce unnecessary complexity into the policy. A good example is 
the common argument against including negative externalities as it may harm 
international competitiveness. There are a number of remedies for this instance, 
including:  wholesale  exemptions;  negotiated  agreements;  offsetting  tax 
deduction  and  financial  incentives  for  energy  efficiency  improvements,  and; 
border tax adjustments. Border tax adjustments on exports work in a similar 
manner to the Australian Goods and Services Tax (GST). A full rebate is payed 
to the exporter to offset the increases in production costs caused by internalising 
externalities  domestically.  Goods  sold  domestically  would  not  receive  the 
adjustment payment (Diesendorf, 2007).  20
Attention should focus on polices and instruments that assist system innovation 
and  manages  interfaces  between  potential  partners,  rather  than  the  common 
Australian approach of unfairly supporting individual companies (Longo and 
Markandya,  2005).  The  policymaker  should  be  aware  of  the  reasons  why 
economists prefer fair and competitive market structures. Open and competitive 
markets:  efficiently  distribute  resources;  self-correct;  stimulate  research  and 
development; produce elastically, and; allow access to any party that wants to 
enter the market (Diesendorf, 2007). 
One  key  driver  of  policy  development  must  be  that  measures  actually  drive 
change. There are moral hazards for market designers as there is the potential to 
design market measures that free-ride on pre-existing policy measures. If the 
targeted outcomes will likely happen in the absence of the measure, there is 
little  point  (MacGill  et  al.,  2006).  The  systematic  long-term  evaluation  of 
policies will also improve the chance of developing a solid empirical base for 
policies that maximise the returns to the community and minimise economic 
inefficiencies. Policy experimentation should logically work hand-in-hand with 
systematic  policy  evaluation,  even  though  the  evaluation  of  policies  can  be 
difficult in practice and may undermine political support for such programmes. 
Policymakers should be aware that particular methods of policy evaluation can 
exaggerate or underestimate the more intangible benefits of policies, such as 
social impacts (Jaffe et al., 2005). However, not attempting to evaluate policies 
at all will simply perpetuate ignorance and leave policymakers vulnerable.  
5. Conclusion 
Globally, policy analyses have increasingly focused on the effects of negative 
externalities on human health, environmental quality, economic development, or 
institutional  objectives  such  as  emissions  growth  management  (Peterson  and 
Rose,  2006).  Providing  regional  certainty  for  private  industry  and  the 
community  in  places  similar  to  Western  Australia  is  necessary  to  maintain 
economic prosperity into the medium to long-term. There is growing pressure 
on policymakers to comprehend the complicated worlds of economic reform 
and  energy  markets  to  make  decisions  regarding  the  future  energy  supply 21
systems we choose to construct. Economic efficiency is crucial for good energy 
policies because the energy sector represents a huge capital investment. Any 
small inefficiency can send considerable repercussions throughout the economy. 
With energy reform sitting squarely within the milieu of climate policy, there is 
a logic to internalising negative externalities in the course of existing energy 
market evolution. 
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